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1 INTRODUCTION 1
Abstract
This paper presents the formal definition of Pragmatics Annotated
Coloured Petri Nets (PA-CPNs). PA-CPNs represent a class of Coloured
Petri Nets (CPNs) that are designed to support automated code genera-
tion of protocol software. PA-CPNs restrict the structure of CPN models
and allow Petri net elements to be annotated with so-called pragmatics,
which are exploited for code generation. The approach and tool for gen-
erating code is called PetriCode and has been discussed and evaluated in
earlier work already. The contribution of this paper is to give a formal def-
inition for PA-CPNs; in addition, we show how the structural restrictions
of PA-CPNs can be exploited for making the verification of the modelled
protocols more efficient. This is done by automatically deriving progress
measures for the sweep-line method, and by introducing so-called service
testers, that can be used to control the part of the state space that is to
be explored for verification purposes.
1 Introduction
Although Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) [2] have been widely used for modelling
and verifying network protocols, rather limited research has been conducted
into approaches that allow us to automatically generate the implementation of
the protocols from the CPN models. And (to the best of our knowledge) there
do not exist approaches that at the same time can be used for verification and
code generation of network protocol software based on CPN models. In earlier
work [5], we have presented an approach and a tool called PetriCode, which
allowed us to automatically generate the protocol software from a restricted class
of CPNs. One of the objectives of PetriCode was to be able to generate code
for different platforms. Another main objective was that the used CPN models
could still be applied for verifying the correctness of the network protocols.
The PetriCode approach uses a class of CPNs with a slightly restricted struc-
ture. On the one hand, these restrictions help making explicit the structure of
the protocol, its principals, channels, and services. On the other hand, these re-
strictions make it possible to automatically generate code, the protocol software,
from the CPNs modelling the protocol. One feature of this class of CPNs are so-
called pragmatics, which are annotations to certain elements of the CPNs, which
indicate the purpose of the respective modelling element and are exploited by
the code generator. This way, models from which code can be generated are not
cluttered with all kinds of technical information so that the same CPN models
can be used for verification and code generation.
The PetriCode approach and tool have been presented, discussed and eval-
uated in earlier work already [5, 6]. In this paper, we formally define this re-
stricted class of CPNs, which we call Pragmatic Annotated CPNs (PA-CPNs).
In addition, we show that PA-CPNs are still amenable to verification, and that
the structural restrictions on that class can actually make the verification more
efficient: First, the structure of PA-CPNs allows us to automatically add so-
called service testers to the model of the protocol, which reduce the state space
of the model and, therefore, reduce the computation effort needed for verifica-
tion. Second, the structural restrictions of PA-CPNs induce a natural progress
measure that can be exploited by a verification technique that is called sweep-
line method [1, 3], which again makes verification more efficient by reducing the
2 PROTOCOL EXAMPLE AND COLOURED PETRI NETS 2
number of states that need to be stored at the same time in the verification tool.
The formal definitions of PA-CPNs are illustrated by a running example, which
is a simple framing protocol. By using this example, we also illustrate how the
structure of PA-CPNs can exploited for verifying the protocol in a more efficient
way.
For the rest of this paper, we assume that the reader is familiar with the
basic concepts of Petri nets and high-level Petri nets in general. In Sect. 2,
we introduce CPNs by an example and rephrase the standard definitions of
CPNs [2]. The example used to explain CPNs in Sect. 2 is already a PA-CPN,
but the specific structure mandated by PA-CPNs will first be discussed and
formalized in Sect. 3 and Sect. 4: Section 3 covers the definitions concerning the
specific pragmatics and restrictions of the different types of PA-CPN modules,
and Sect. 4 formalizes one specific aspect, which makes sure that services can
be represented by typical constructs for control flow. In Sect. 5, we discuss and
formalize the extension of PA-CPNs with so-called service testers, which can
be used for more efficiently verifying the model of the protocols. The actual
verification by using the sweep-line method is discussed in Sect. 6. At last, in
Sect. 7, we sum up the general findings and briefly discuss related work.
2 Protocol Example and Coloured Petri Nets
The definition of PA-CPNs relies on the definition of hierarchical CPNs given in
[2]. Below we introduce the basic definitions and notations for hierarchical CPNs
and the protocol CPN model that we will use as a running example throughout
this paper. We present only the syntactical definition of hierarchical CPNs as
PA-CPNs have the same semantics as ordinary hierarchical CPNs for simulation
and verification purposes.
2.1 Protocol Example
The CPN model to be used as a running example models a protocol consisting
of a sender and a receiver operating over an unreliable channel which may both
re-order and loose messages. The sender sends messages tagged with sequence
numbers to the receiver and waits for an acknowledgement for each message
to be returned from the receiver before sending the next message. Hence, the
protocol operates according to the stop-and-wait principle.
The CPN model of the protocol consists of eight hierarchically organised
modules . Below we present selected modules of the CPN model used to illus-
trate the definition and verification techniques in this paper1. Figure 1 shows the
top-level module consisting of three substitution transitions (drawn as double-
bordered rectangles) and representing the Sender, the Receiver, and the Channel
connecting them. The two places SenderChannel and ReceiverChannel model
buffering communication endpoints connecting the sender and the receiver to
the communication channel. The definition of the colour set (type) Endpoint
determining the kind of tokens that can reside on these two places is provided in
Fig. 2. Each of the three substitution transitions has an associated submodule
indicated by the rectangular tag positioned next to the substitution transition.
1The complete CPN model is available via www.petricode.org/examples/
SWProtocol+driver.cpn
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<<channel(unreliable, noorder, bidirectional)>>
Channel
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<<principal>>
Receiver
Figure 1: The top-level (prime) CPN module of the protocol model
colset Packet = union DATA : Data + ACK : Ack;
colset EndpointId = INT;
colset ChannelPacket =
record src : EndpointId * dest : EndpointId
* packet : Packet;
colset ChannelPackets = list ChannelPacket;
colset Endpoint = record name : EndpointId *
inb : ChannelPackets *
outb : ChannelPackets;
Figure 2: Colour set (type) declarations used in Fig. 1
The annotations written in 〈〈 〉〉 are the pragmatics annotations that we for-
mally introduce in the next section when defining PA-CPNs; they can be ignored
for now.
Figure 3 shows the Sender module, which is the submodule associated with
the Sender substitution transition in Fig 1 and defines the protocol for the
Sender principal. The module has two substitution transitions modelling the
main operations of the sender which is the sending of messages (substitution
transition send) and the reception of acknowledgements (substitution transition
receiveAck). The places ready, runAck, and nextSend are used to model the
internal state of the sender. The place ready has an initial marking consisting
of a token with the colour () (unit) which is the single value contained in the
predefined colour set UNIT. This indicates that initially the sender is ready
to perform a send operation. For a place with colour set UNIT, we omit (by
convention) the specification of the colour set in the graphical representation.
The place runAck, which has a boolean colour set, initially contains a token
with the value false indicating that the sender is not initially in a state where
it can receive acknowledgements. The place nextSend is used to keep track of
the sequence of the message that the sender is currently sending. The place
SenderChannel is a port place (indicated by the double border) and is used by
the module to exchange tokens with its upper level module, which was shown
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Figure 3: The sender CPN module
in Fig. 1. In this case, SenderChannel is an input-output port place as specified
by the In/Out tag positioned next to the place. The place is associated with
the SenderChannel socket place in Fig. 1 which means that any tokens removed
(added) from (to) this place in the Sender module will also be reflected in the
Protocol module.
Figure 4 shows the Send module which is the submodule of the send sub-
stitution transition in Fig. 3. This submodule models the sending of a list of
messages from the sender to the receiver. The port places ready, SenderChannel,
nextSend, and runAck are associated with the accordingly named socket places
in the module shown in Fig. 3. The list of messages to be sent is provided via
the place message (top) annotated with the driver pragmatic. This place is
a fusion place as indicated by the rectangular tag positioned next to the place.
The name inside the tag specifies the fusion set that the place belongs to. A
fusion set is a set of places with the property that when tokens are removed
(added) to one place in the set, then the token will be removed (added) to all
members. Conceptually, all the places of a fusion set are merged into a single
compound place. The place end (at the bottom) annotated with a driver
pragmatic is also a member of a fusion set. These fusion sets are used to con-
nect PA-CPNs to test driver modules to be introduced later; these places are,
formally, not part of the service level module or the complete protocol. The
places annotated by the driver pragmatic are used by the test driver module
to control the order and the parameters of the invocation of the services of the
protocol during the verification of the protocol (see Sect. 5 and Sect. 6). The
code generator ignores these places since, in the actual protocol software, the
services of the protocol are invoked externally; the order of invocation of the
services and the parameters are determined by the protocol’s environment.
The sending of a list of messages starts with the occurrence of the transitions
send, which places the list of messages to be sent on place message, puts a
token on the place nextSend corresponding to the first sequence number, and a
token on place runAck to indicate that acknowledgements can now be received.
The place limit is used to put an upper bound on the number of attempts
to retransmit a message when the transmission fails. After an occurrence of
transition send, transition sendMsg may occur sending a message by putting it
in the output buffer modelled by the place SenderChannel. The guard used on
the transition sendMsg (by convention written in square brackets next to the
transition) ensures that the data being sent matches the sequence number of the
message currently being sent. If the retransmission limit is reached, the sender
will stop as modelled by the transition return putting a token on place end. If
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maxResend)]
return
<<return>>
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packet= DATA data}]}
if i > j
then (i,0)
else (i, c +1)
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dataList dataList
Figure 4: The Send module
colset LimitMap = product INT * INT;
colset Data = product INT * INT * STRING;
colset DataList = list Data;
val maxResend = 2;
var i, j, k, l, c, e, n :INT;
var data : Data;
var dataList : DataList;
var str : STRING;
Figure 5: Colour set (type) declarations used in Fig. 4
the retransmission limit is not reached for the current message, the transition
loop will put a token back on startSending such that the next message can be
sent. The colour set definitions and variables used in the inscriptions of Fig. 4
are provided in Fig. 5.
Above, we have presented the example CPN model that will be used as a
running example throughout this paper, and we have informally introduced the
hierarchical constructs of CPNs in the form of modules, substitution transitions,
port and socket places, and fusion places.
2.2 Formal Definitions of Hierarchical CPNs
In this subsection, we formally define hierarchical CPNs as the later formal
definition of PA-CPNs will be based on the formal definition of hierarchical
CPNs. Definition 2.1 provides the formal definition of CPN modules. In the
definition, we use Type[v] to denote the type of a variable v, and we use EXPRV
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to denote the set of expressions with free variables contained in a set of variables
V . For an expression e containing a set of free variables V , we denote by e〈b〉
the result of evaluating e in a binding b that assigns a value to each variable in
V . We use Type[e] for an expression e (an arc expression, a guard, or an initial
marking) to denote the the type of e. For a non-empty set S, we use SMS to
denote the type corresponding to the set of all multi-sets over S.
Definition 2.1. A Coloured Petri Net Module (Def. 6.1 in [2]) is a tuple
CPNM = (CPN, Tsub, Pport, PT ), such that:
1. CPN = (P, T,A,Σ, V, C,G,E, I) is a Coloured Petri Net (Def. Y in [2])
where:
(a) P is a finite set of places and T is a finite set of transitions T such
that P ∩ T = ∅.
(b) A ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) is a set of directed arcs.
(c) Σ is a finite set of non-empty colour sets and V is a finite set of
typed variables such that Type[v] ∈ Σ for all variables v ∈ V .
(d) C : P → Σ is a colour set function that assigns a colour set to
each place.
(e) E : A → EXPRV is an arc expression function that assigns an
arc expression to each arc a such that Type[E(a)] = C(p)MS , where
p is the place connected to the arc a.
(f) G : T → EXPRV is a guard function that assigns a guard to each
transition t such that Type[G(t)] = Bool .
(g) I : P → EXPR∅ is an initialisation function that assigns an ini-
tialisation expression to each place p such that Type[I(p)] = C(p)MS .
2. Tsub ⊆ T is a set of substitution transitions.
3. Pport ⊆ P is a set of port places.
4. PT : Pport → {IN,OUT, I/O} is a port type function that assigns a
port type to each port place.
Socket places are not defined explicitly as part of a module because they
are implicitly given via the arcs connected to the substitution transition. For a
substitution transition t, we denote by ST (t) a mapping that maps each socket
place p into its type, i.e., ST (t)(p) = IN if p is an input socket, ST (t)(p) = OUT
if p is an output socket, and ST (t)(p) = I/O if p is an input/output socket.
The definition of a hierarchical CPN is provided below. A hierarchical CPN
consists of a set of disjoint CPN modules, a submodule function assigning a
(sub)module to each substitution transition, and a port-socket relation that
associates port places in a submodule to the socket places of its upper layer
module. The set of socket places for a substitution transition t are the place
connected to the substitution transition and is denoted by Psock(t). The defini-
tion requires that the module hierarchy (to be defined in Def. 2.3) is acyclic in
order to ensure that there are only a finite number of instances of each module.
Furthermore, port and socket places can only be associated with each other, if
they have the same colour set and the same initial marking.
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Definition 2.2. A hierarchical Coloured Petri Net (Def. 6.2 in [2]) is a
four-tuple CPNH = (S,SM ,PS ,FS ) where:
1. S is a finite set of modules. Each module is a Coloured Petri Net
Module s = ((P s, T s, As,Σs, V s, Cs, Gs, Es, Is), T ssub, P
s
port, PT
s). It is
required that (P s1 ∪T s1)∩ (P s2 ∪T s2) = ∅ for all s1, s2 ∈ S with s1 6= s2.
2. SM : Tsub → S is a submodule function that assigns a submodule to
each substitution transition. It is required that the module hierarchy (see
Definition 2.3) is acyclic.
3. PS is a port–socket relation function that assigns a port–socket
relation PS (t) ⊆ Psock(t) × P
SM (t)
port to each substitution transition t. It
is required that ST (t)(p) = PT (p′), C(p) = C(p′), and I(p)〈〉 = I(p′)〈〉
for all (p, p′) ∈ PS (t) and all t ∈ Tsub.
4. FS ⊆ 2P is a set of non-empty and disjoint fusion sets such that C(p) =
C(p′) and I(p)〈〉 = I(p′)〈〉 for all p, p′ ∈ fs and all fs ∈ FS .
The module hierarchy of a hierarchical CPN model is a directed graph with
a node for each module and an arc leading from one module to another module
if the latter module is a submodule of one of the substitution transitions of
the former module. In the definition, Tsub denotes the union of all substitution
transitions of the hierarchical CPN, and T ssub denotes all substitution transitions
in a module s.
Definition 2.3. The module hierarchy for a hierarchical Coloured Petri Net
CPNH = (S,SM ,PS ,FS ) is a directed graph MH = (NMH , AMH ), where
1. NMH = S is the set of nodes.
2. AMH = {(s1, t, s2) ∈ NMH × Tsub ×NMH | t ∈ T
s1
sub
∧ s2 = SM (t)} is the
set of arcs.
The roots of MH are called prime modules, and the set of all prime modules
is denoted SPM.
3 Pragmatic Annotated CPNs
PA-CPNs mandates a particular structure of the CPN models and enables the
CPN elements to be annotated with pragmatics used to direct the automated
code generation. In a PA-CPN, the modules of the CPNmodel are required to be
organised into three levels referred to as the protocol system level , the principal
level , and the service level . In a PA-CPN, it is required that there exists exactly
one prime module. This prime module represents the protocol system level.
The Protocol module shown in Fig. 1 comprises the protocol system level of
the PA-CPN model of the framing protocol; it specifies the protocol principals
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in the system and the channels connecting them. The substitution transitions
representing principals are specified using the principal pragmatic, and the
substitution transitions representing channels are specified using the channel
pragmatic. In the CPN model, pragmatics are shown by annotations enclosed
in guillemets. On the principal level, there is one module for each principal of
the protocol as defined on the protocol system level. The framing protocol has
two modules at the principal level corresponding to the sender and the receiver.
Figure 3 shows the principal level module for the sender. A principal level
module is required to model the services that the principal is providing, and
the internal states and life-cycle of the principal. For the sender, there are two
services, which are indicated by the service pragmatics: send and receiveAck.
Substitution transition representing services that can be externally invoked are
specified using the service pragmatic, whereas services that are to be invoked
only internally are specified using the internal pragmatic. The service level
modules model the behaviour of the individual services. The module in Fig. 4 is
an example of a module at the service level modelling the send service provided
by the sender principal.
We formally define PA-CPNs as a tuple consisting of a hierarchical CPN, a
protocol system module (PSM), a set of principal level modules (PLMs), a set of
service level modules (SLMs), a set of channel modules (CHMs), and a structural
pragmatics mapping (SP) that maps substitution transitions into structural
pragmatics and capturing the annotation of the substitution transitions. It
should be noted that since channel modules do not play a role in the code
generation but are only a CPN model artifact used to connect the principals for
simulation purposes, we do not impose any specific requirements to the internal
structure of channel level modules.
Definition 3.1. A Pragmatics Annotated Coloured Petri Net (PA-CPN)
is a tuple CPN PA = (CPNH ,PSM ,PLM ,SLM ,CHM ,SP), where:
1. CPNH = (S, SM,PS, FS) is a hierarchical CPN.
2. PSM ∈ S is a protocol system module (see Def. 3.2) and the only
prime module of CPNH .
3. PLM ⊆ S is a set of principal level modules (see Def. 3.3).
4. SLM ⊆ S is a set of service level modules (see Def. 3.4).
5. CHM ⊆ S is a set of channel modules.
6. PSM ,PLM ,SLM ,CHM constitute a partition of S.
7. SP : Tsub → {principal,service,internal,channel} is a struc-
tural pragmatics mapping such that:
(a) Substitution transitions annotated with a principal pragmatic
have an associated principal level module:
∀t ∈ Tsub : SP(t) = principal⇒ SM (t) ∈ PLM
(b) Substitution transitions annotated with a service or internal
pragmatic are associated with a service level module:
∀t ∈ Tsub : SP(t) = service ∧ SP(t) = internal ⇒ SM (t) ∈
SLM
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(c) Substitution transitions annotated with a channel pragmatic are
associated with a channel module:
∀t ∈ Tsub : SP(t) = channel⇒ SM (t) ∈ CHM
The protocol system module (PSM) models the principals of the protocol
and the channels that connects them. The PSM module is defined as a tuple
consisting of a CPN module and a pragmatic mapping PM that associates a
pragmatic to each substitution transition. The requirement to the module is
that all substitution transitions must be substitution transitions and annotated
with either a principal or a channel pragmatic. Furthermore, two substi-
tution transitions representing principals cannot be connected only by a place,
there must be a substitution transition representing a channel in between. This
reflects the fact that it is possible for principals to communicate via channels
only2.
Definition 3.2. A Protocol System Module of a PA-CPN with a structural
pragmatics mapping SPPA is a tuple CPNPSM = (CPN
PSM ,PM ), where:
1. CPNPSM =
((PPSM , TPLM , APSM ,ΣPSM , V PSM , CPSM , GPSM , EPSM , IPSM ),
TPSMsub , P
PSM
port ,PT
PSM ) is a CPN module (see Def. 2.1).
2. All transitions are substitution transitions TPSM = TPSMsub .
3. PM : TPSMsub → {principal,channel} is a pragmatics mapping sat-
isfying:
(a) All substitution transitions are annotated with either principal or
channel pragmatic: ∀t ∈ TPSMsub : PM (t) ∈ {principal,channel}.
(b) The pragmatics mapping must coincide with the structural pragmatic
mapping of PA-CPN: ∀t ∈ TPSMsub : PM (t) = SP(t).
(c) All places are connected to at most one substitution transition an-
notated with principal and at most one annotated with channel:
∀p ∈ PPSM : ∀t1, t2 ∈ X(p) : PM (t1) = PM (t2)⇒ t1 = t2.
A principal level module specifies the services provided by a principal and
is defined as a tuple consisting of a CPN module and a principal level prag-
matic mapping PLP . Each service is represented by a substitution transition
which can be annotated with either a service or internal pragmatic depending
on whether the service is visible externally or not. The non-port places of a
principal level model can be annotated with either a state or an LCV prag-
matic. Places annotated with a state pragmatic represent internal states of
the principal, whereas places annotated with an LCV pragmatic represent the
life-cycle of the principal by putting restrictions on the order in which services
can be invoked. As an example, the place ready in Fig. 3 ensures that only one
message at a time is sent using the send service.
2In the definition, we use X(p) to denote the set of transitions connected to a place p.
3 PRAGMATIC ANNOTATED CPNS 10
Definition 3.3. A Principal Level Module of a PA-CPN with a structural
pragmatics mapping SPPA is a tuple
CPNPLM = (CPNPLM , T
PLM
sub , P
PLM
port ,PT
PLM ,PLP) where:
1. CPNPLM = (P
PLM , TPLM , APLM ,ΣPLM , V PLM , CPLM , GPLM , EPLM ,
IPLM ) is a CPN module (see Def. 2.1).
2. All transitions are substitution transitions: TPLM = TPLMsub
3. PLP : TPSMsub ∪ P
PLM \ PPLMport → {service,internal,state,LCV} is
a principal level pragmatics mapping satisfying:
(a) All non-port places are annotated with either a state or a LCV
pragmatic: ∀p ∈ PPLM \ PPLMport ⇒ PLP(p) ∈ {state,LCV}
(b) All substitution transitions are annotated with a service or internal
pragmatic: ∀t ∈ TPSMsub : PLP(t) ∈ {service,internal}.
It should be noted that we do not associate any pragmatics with the port
place of the module as it follows from the definition of the protocol system
module that a port place in a principal level module can only be associated
with a socket place connected to a channel substitution transition.
The service level modules specify the detailed behaviour of the individual
services and constitute the lowest level modules in a PA-CPN model. In par-
ticular, there are no substitution transitions in modules at this level. The Send
module in Fig. 4 is an example of a module at the service level. It models the be-
haviour of the send service in a control-flow oriented manner. The control-flow
path, which defines the control flow of the service, is made explicit via the use
of the Id pragmatics. The entry point of the service is indicated by annotating
a single transition with a service pragmatic, and the exit (termination) point
of the service is indicated by annotating a single transition with a return prag-
matic. In addition, a non-port place can be annotated with a state pragmatic to
indicate that this place models a local state of the service. The driver is used
by service tester modules to facilitate verification by reducing the state space
of the protocol model. The places annotated with an Id pragmatic determine
a subset of the module, which we call the underlying control-flow net ; and it
is required that this net is block decomposable (which will be defined later in
Sect. 4) in order to support a natural translation into programming language
control flow structures. In Fig. 4, the underlying control flow net is highlighted
via the places, transitions, and arcs having a thick border. A service level mod-
ule is defined as consisting of a CPN module without substitution transitions
and with a service level pragmatic mapping that associates pragmatics to the
model elements as described above.
In the definition below we use the notation ∃!x ∈ X : p(x) to denote that
there exists exactly one element x in a set X satisfying a predicate p – i. e. the
element x is uniquely characterized by property p(x).
Definition 3.4. A Service Level Module is a tuple CPN SLM = (CPN SLM ,
T SLMsub , P
SLM
port ,PT
SLM ,SLP ,SLT ) where:
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1. CPN SLM = (P
SLM , TSLM , ASLM ,ΣSLM , V SLM , CSLM , GSLM , ESLM , ISLM )
is a CPN module (see Def. 2.1)
2. There are no substitution transitions: T SLMsub = ∅.
3. SLP : TPLM∪PPLM\PPLMport → {Id,state,service,return,driver}
is a service level pragmatic mapping satisfying:
(a) Each place is either annotated with Id, state, driver or is a port
place : ∀p ∈ PSLM \ PSLMport : SLP (p) = Id ∨ SLP (p) = state ∨
SLP (p) = driver
(b) There exits exactly one transition annotated with service:
∃!t ∈ TSLM : SLP (t) = service
(c) There exits exactly one transition annotated with return:
∃!t ∈ TSLM : SLP (t) = return
4. For all t ∈ TSLM and p ∈ PSLM we have:
(a) Transitions consume one token from input places annotated with an
Id pragmatic: (p, t) ∈ ASLM ∧ SLP (p) = Id ⇒ |E(p, t)〈b〉| = 1 for
all bindings b of t.
(b) Transitions produce one token on output places annotated with an
Id pragmatic: (t, p) ∈ ASLM ∧ SLP (p) = Id ⇒ |E(t, p)〈b〉| = 1 for
all bindings b of t.
(c) Only transitions annotated with a service pragmatic can have in-
put places annotated with a driver pragmatic:
(p, t) ∈ ASLM ∧ SLP (p) = driver⇒ SLP (t) = service
(d) Only transitions annotated with a return pragmatic can have out-
put places annotated with a driver pragmatic:
(t, p) ∈ ASLM ∧ SLP (p) = driver⇒ SLP (t) = return
5. The underlying control flow block of CPN SLM (Def. 4.2) is tree decom-
posable (Def. 4.4).
4 Block Decomposition of Control Flow Nets
In this section, we define formally when the control flow of a service level module
is decomposable into blocks. Figure 6 shows the underlying control flow net of
the service level module for the send operation of the sender from Fig. 4, which
is a loop construct, basically.
In order to formally define the block decomposition, we need to define blocks
first: these are Petri nets with a fixed entry and exit place. Then, we define the
underlying control flow net of a service module. At last, we define when a block
is decomposable into blocks, which represent the control flow constructs.
Figure 7 shows a graphical representation of a block in general, where the
start and end place of the block are graphically represented by arcs from resp.
to the border of the block.
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Figure 6: Decomposition of the control flow net of module SenderSend
Figure 7: Graphical representation of a block.
Definition 4.1 (Block, atomic non-returning block).
Let N = (P, T,A) be a Petri net and s, e ∈ P . Then B = (P, T,A, s, e) is called
a block with entry s and exit e.
The block is atomic, if P = {s, e}, s 6= e, |T | = 1 and for t ∈ T , we have
•t = {s} and t• = {e}.
The block has a safe entry, if s 6= e and •s = ∅ (i. e. the block will not return
a token to the start place itself). The block has a safe exit, if s 6= e and e• = ∅
(i. e. the block does not use a token from the end place itself).
An atomic block consists of a single transition, as shown in Fig. 10 later.
For visualizing blocks with safe entry and safe exit, we introduce an additional
graphical notation, which is shown in Fig. 8. The crossed out arc from within
the block to the start place indicates that the block itself does not return a
token to the entry place (safe entry); the crossed out arc from the end place to
the interior of the block indicates that the block itself does not remove a token
from its exit place (safe exit).
Figure 8: Graphical representation of safe entry and safe exit.
For easing the following definitions, we introduce an additional notation:
For a block Bi, we refer to its constituents by Bi = (Pi, Ti, Au, si, ei) without
explicitly naming them every time.
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The block that is underlying a service level model is basically obtained by
all the places that are annotated with the Id pragmatics and the transitions in
their pre- and postsets. The unique transition with the service pragmatics
defines the entry place, and the unique transition with the return defines the
exit place of this block; note that for technical reasons, these two transitions are
not part of the block. Therefore, these transitions are shown by dashed lines in
Fig. 6
Definition 4.2. [Underlying control flow net of SLM] Let CPN SLM be a service
level module as defined in Def. 3.4. Let P = {p ∈ PSLM \PSLMport |SLP (p) = Id},
let T = TSLM ∩• P ∩P •, and let A = ASLM ∩ ((T ×P )∪ (P × T ))}; moreover,
let s ∈ P be the unique place such that there exists a transition t ∈ T = TSLM
with (t, s) ∈ ASLM and SLP (t) = service, and let e ∈ P be the unique place
e such that there exists a transition t ∈ T = TSLM with (e, t) ∈ ASLM and
SLP (t) = return.
Then, we call N = (P, T,A, s, e) the underlying control flow net of
CPN SLM .
The control flow of the generated code will be obtained by decomposing
the underlying control flow net of a service level module into sub-blocks, which
represent the control flow constructs. Note that we define the decomposition
in a very general way at first, which does not yet restrict the possible control
constructs. The decomposition into blocks, just makes sure that all parts of the
block are covered by sub-blocks and that they overlap on entry and exit places
only. In a second step, the decomposition is restricted in such a way that the
decomposition captures certain control flow constructs (Def. 4.4).
Definition 4.3 (Decomposition of a block).
Let B = (N, s, e) be a block with net N = (P, T, F ).
A set of blocks B1, . . . , Bn is called a decomposition of block B, if the fol-
lowing conditions are met:
1. The sub-blocks contain only elements from B, i. e. for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
we have Pi ⊆ P , Ti ⊆ T , and Fi ⊆ F ∩ ((Pi × Ti) ∪ (Ti × Pi)).
2. The sub-blocks contain all elements of B, i. e. P =
⋃n
i=1 Pi, T =
⋃n
i=1 Ti,
and F =
⋃n
i=1 Fi
3. The inner structure of all sub-blocks are disjoint, i. e. for each i, j ∈
{1, . . . , n} with i 6= j, we have Ti∩Tj = ∅ and Pi∩Pj = {si, ei}∩{sj , ej}.
Note that, in some cases, two consecutive blocks should be safe, which means
that either the exit of the preceding block is safe, or the entry of the succeeding
block is safe or both. We represent this graphically as shown in Fig. 9.
Figure 9: Safe join of two consecutive blocks
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At last, we define when a decomposition of a block reflects some control
flow construct. Note that this definition does not only define decomposability
into control constructs; it also defines a tree structure which reflects the control
structure of the block. The formal definition is illustrated in Fig. 10.
Definition 4.4 (Tree decompositions of a block).
The block trees associated with a block are inductively defined:
• If B is an atomic block, then the tree with the single node B : atomic is
a block tree associated with B.
• If B is a block and B1 and B2 is a decomposition of B, and for some X,
B1 : X is a block tree associated with B1, and B2 : atomic is a block tree
associated with B2, and if B1 has a safe entry and a safe exit and s1 = s,
e1 = e, s2 = e, and e2 = s, then the tree with top node B : loop and the
sequence of sub-trees B1 : X and B2 : atomic is a block tree associated
with B.
• If B is a block and for some n with n ≥ 2 the set of blocks B1, . . . , Bn
is a decomposition of B, and have a safe entry and a safe exit, and
B1 : X1, . . . , Bn : Xn for some X1, . . . , Xn are block trees associated with
B1, . . . , Bn, and if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have si = s and ei = e, then
the tree with top node B : choice with the sequence of sub-trees Bi : Xi
is a block tree associated with B.
• If B is a block and for some n with n ≥ 2 the set of blocks B1, . . . , Bn is a
decomposition of B, and, for some X1, . . . , Xn, the trees B1 : X1, . . . , Bn :
Xn are block trees associated with B1, . . . , Bn, and if there exist different
places p0, . . . , pn ∈ P such that s = p0, e = pn, and for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n−
1} we have si = pi, ei = pi+1, and Bi has a safe exist or Bi+1 has a safe
entry, then the tree with top node B : sequence and the sequence of
sub-trees Bi : Xi is a block tree associated with B.
Note that the tree decomposition of a block is not necessarily unique. For
example a longer sequence of atomic blocks could be decomposed into different
junks. The reason is that sequences can have arbitrary length according to our
definition, which makes the definitions much more elegant and allows us to have
long sequences in a single sequence construct. The tool actually resolves this
ambiguity by making blocks with a sequence as large as possible.
Fig. 4 is an example of an SLM. Its underlying control flow net was shown in
Fig. 6. This block is decomposed in a loop, which in turn consists of an atomic
block. The service transition itself as well as the return transition are actually
not part of the underlying control flow net.
5 Service Testers
The service level modules constitute the active part of a PA-CPN model, and
the execution of the individual service provided by a principal starts at the
transition annotated with a service pragmatic. The transitions annotated
with a service pragmatic typically has a number of parameters which need to be
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Figure 10: Inductive definition of block trees
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Figure 11: The Service tester
bound to values in order for the transition to occur. An example of this is the
Send service transition in Fig. 4 which has dataList is a parameter. This means
that there are often an infinite number of bindings for a service transition.
To control the execution of a PA-CPN model when conducting validation by
means of simulation and verification by means of state space exploration, we
introduce the concept of service tester modules which can be used to guide the
validation and verification process and represent a user of the service provided
by the principal modules. An added advantage of service testers is that they can
further contribute to reducing the state space during verification and progress
measures can be automatically computed and used in conjunction with the
sweep-line method for state-space exploration as will be explained in Sect. 6.
The service tester modules will be connected to the rest of the PA-CPN
model through fusion places, and the service tester modules invokes the service
provided by the principal by putting tokens on these places. Similarly, the
service tester also receives any results from the invoked services via tokens on
these fusion places. The fusion places used to connect service level modules
and service tester modules are the only way fusion places are used on top of
the concepts of PA-CPNs. In addition to the fusion places, a service tester
module has an explicit control flow path similar to service level modules and Id
pragmatics are used to make this explicit.
Figure 11 shows a server tester module for the PA-CPN model introduced in
Sect. 3. The service tester drives the execution of a CPN model through fusion
places. A service tester module is allowed to have only a single Id place that
initially contains a token. In the case of Fig. 11, this is the place d0. The test
driver first invokes the send service in Fig. 4 by putting a token in the fusion
place message. Next, the service tester invokes the receive service in the receiver
principal.
Below we formalise the control flow part of a service tester. In the definition,
we use I(p)〈〉 to denote the result of evaluating the initial marking expression
I(p) of a place p.
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Definition 5.1. A Service Tester Module is a tuple CPN STM = (CPN STM ,
T STMsub , P
SLM
port ,PT
SLM ,TPM ) where:
1. CPN SLM = (P
SLM , TSLM , ASLM ,ΣSLM , V SLM , CSLM , GSLM , ESLM , ISLM )
is a CPN module (see Def. 2.1)
2. There are no substitution transitions: T STMsub = ∅.
3. TPM : PSTM → {Id,driver,LCV} is a service tester pragmatic
mapping.
4. ∃!p ∈ I such that |ISTM (p)〈〉| = 1.
5. For all t ∈ TSLM and p ∈ PSLM we have:
(a) Transitions consume one token from input places annotated with an
Id pragmatic: (p, t) ∈ ASLM ∧ TPM(p) = Id⇒ |E(p, t)〈b〉| = 1 for
all bindings b of t.
(b) Transitions produce one token on output places annotated with an
Id pragmatic: (t, p) ∈ ASLM ∧ TPM(p) = Id⇒ |E(t, p)〈b〉| = 1 for
all bindings b of t.
6. Transitions and places annotated with a LCV pragmatic must be connected
with a double arc:
∀p ∈ PSTM , t ∈ TSLM : TPM(p) = LCV⇒ ((t, p) ∈ A⇔ (p, t) ∈ A)
7. The underlying control flow block of CPN STM (Def. 4.2) is tree decom-
posable (Def. 4.4)
As explained above, the idea is that a set of service tester modules can
be connected to a PA-CPN by means of fusion places in order to control the
execution of the services. Formally, we therefore define a PA-CPN equipped with
service tester modules as a hierarchical CPN consisting of a set of modules that
constitute a PA-CPN according to Def. 3.1 and a set of service tester modules
which all constitute prime modules. Furthermore, we require that fusion places
are connecting the service level modules and the service tester module so that
they correspond to the invocation of services and collecting of a results from an
executed service.
Definition 5.2. A Pragmatics Annotated Coloured Petri Net with Ser-
vice Testers is tuple CPN PAT = (CPNH ,PSM ,PLM ,SLM ,CHM ,SP ,STM ),
where:
1. CPNH = (S, SM,PS, FS) is a hierarchical CPN.
2. CPN PAT = (CPNH ,PSM ,PLM ,SLM ,CHM ,SP) is a PA-CPN
3. STM ∈ S is a set of service tester modules all of which are prime modules.
4. The following conditions hold for all fusion sets fs ∈ FS:
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(a) Places in a fusion set are either all annotated with a driver prag-
matic or all annotated with a LCV pragmatic.
(b) A fusion set containing places with driver pragmatics can only
contain places from a single service layer module and a single service
tester module.
(c) A fusion set containing places with LCV pragmatics can only contain
places related via a port-socket relationship or places belonging to
service tester modules.
(d) If p ∈ fs belongs to a service level module and has an output arc
to a transition with a service pragmatic, then all places pt ∈ fs
belonging to a service tester module STM have only input arcs from
transitions in STM .
(e) If p ∈ fs belongs to a service level module and has an input arc
to a transition with a return pragmatic, then all places pt ∈ fs
belonging to a service tester module STM can have output arcs to
transitions in STM only.
6 Verification
State space exploration is the main verification method for CPNs and is based
on the idea of explicitly enumerating the set of reachable states of the CPN
model. Generally, this approach is limited by the available memory since the
states need to be stored while the state space is generated. A large collection
of techniques have been developed in order to alleviate this inherent complexity
problem. In this section, we show how the sweep-line method [1, 3] can be
used to alleviate the state explosion problem when conducting verification of
PA-CPNs with service testers.
6.1 The Sweep-Line Method
The basic idea of the sweep-line method is to exploit a notion of progress ex-
hibited by many systems. Exploiting progress makes it possible to explore all
reachable states while storing only small subsets of the state space in memory
at a time. This way, much larger state spaces can be investigated since never
all states need to be stored at the same time. The additional structure imposed
on CPNs by PA-CPNs and services testers means that PA-CPN models have
several potential sources of progress that can be exploited by the sweep-line
method. The control-flow in the service modules is one source of progress as
there is a natural progression from the entry point of the service towards the
exit point of the service. The life-cycle of a principal is another potential source
of progress as there will often be an overall intended order in which the services
provided by a principal is to be invoked, and this will be reflected in the life-
cycle variables of the principal. Finally, the service testers are also a source of
progress as a service tester will inherently progress from the start of the test
towards the end of the test.
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The subsets of states stored are determined via a progress value assigned to
each state, and the method explores the states in a least-progress-first order.
The sweep-line method explores states with a given progress value before pro-
gressing to the states with a higher progress value. When the method proceeds
to consider states with a higher progress value, it deletes the states with a lower
progress value from memory. The basic idea is to optimistically assume that the
system does not regress , and hence states with a lower progress value will not
be visited again and do not need to be kept in memory. If it turns out that the
system regresses, then the method will mark states at the end of regress edges
as persistent (i. e., store them permanently in memory) in order to ensure ter-
mination. In the presence of regression, the sweep-line method may visit some
states multiple times. The fact that the sweep-line method deletes states means
that verification of properties needs to be conducted on-the-fly during the state
space exploration.
To apply the sweep-line method a progress measure must be provided for
the model as formalised below where S denotes the set of all states (markings)
and →∗ the reachability relation of the CPN model:
Definition 6.1 (Progress Measure). A progress measure is a tuple P =
(O,⊑, ψ) such that O is a set of progress values, ⊑ is a total order on O, and
ψ : S → O is a progress mapping. P is monotonic if ∀s, s′ ∈ R(ι) : s →∗
s′ ⇒ ψ(s) ⊑ ψ(s′). Otherwise, P is non-monotonic.
The sweep-line method does not mandate any origin of the progress measure
and in many cases the progress measure is provided by the modeller based upon
knowledge about the modelled systems. For PA-CPNs, however, a reasonable
progress measure can be derived from the model automatically as we will show
in the next section.
6.2 Progress Measures for Sweep-line Verification Meth-
ods
For our example protocol above, the progress measure could be a vector of
measures using the number of tokens on some of its places (omitting the parts
of the model that we did not show in this paper):
(|d0|, |d1|, |d2|, |d3|, |startSending| + |next|, |end|, . . .)
The order on two such vectors would be compared lexicographically, meaning
the order of the different entries represents their significance.
The first four entries represent the progress in the service tester (Fig. 11).
The next two entries represent the progress within the send service (Fig.4); note
that since the places startSending and next are on a loop, tokens can flow back
from place next to place startSending. The end place is actually the respective
driver place from the tester, which propagates the progress between the service
and tester. Therefore, the tokens on both places within this loop are counted
the same (added up in the same entry of the vector).
An alternative progress measure is shown below (omitting the parts of the
model that we did not show in this paper):
(|d0|, |d1|, |d2|, |d3|, |startSending|, |next|, |end|, . . .)
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The difference between the two are based on how loops are handled. In this
progress the places on loops are append to the vector as if the loop was not
there. In the present example this is shown by havin replaced the + operator
between startSending and next with a comma.
We used the service tester as the first and, therefore, most significant mea-
sures since these are indicating the progress within the test. Then we measure
the progress within the service. In some cases, it might make sense to take
life-cycle variables into account for measuring the progress. But, this depends
very much on the protocol and whether the life-cycle variables monotonically
increase in the course of the protocol. In our example, the life-cycle variable
ready of the sender module does not indicate any progress; therefore, it is not
part of the progress measure that we have shown above.
Generally, coming up with a good progress measure requires some experience
and a good understanding of the protocol. For the test drivers and the services
modules, however, some reasonable progress measures can be derived automati-
cally by exploiting the block structure of the respective modules (a sequence for
the tester and a loop for the service, in our example). We formalize this below,
basically generalizing the idea from the above example.
The progress measure is defined on top of the tree decomposition of the
blocks underlying the corresponding service tester model or the service module.
Technically, the tree decomposition of the blocks was formally defined for service
level modules only. It is straight forward to adjust this definition to service tester
modules, but we do not formalize that here. In the following, we assume that
we have the tree decomposition of the respective module. Then we define a
simple progress measure and a complex one. The simple one, would just add
up the number of all tokens in loops, not looking into their detailed structure;
the complex one would also take the progress within loops into account.
Definition 6.2 (Progress measures). LetBT be a block tree for a CPN module.
The sequence of simple progress measures entries for BT is defined induc-
tively over the block tree BT of the CPN module:
• If BT is B : atomic, then simple progress sequence consist of |s|, |e| where
s is the entry place of the block B and e is the exit place.
• If BT is B : sequence with sub blocks B1, . . . Bn, and e
1
i , . . . , e
ki
i are the
simple progress sequences for Bi, then
e11, . . . , e
k1−1
1 , e
1
2, . . . , e
k2−1
2 , . . . , e
1
n, . . . , e
kn
n is the simple progress sequence
for BT .
• If BT is B : choice with sub blocks B1, . . . Bn, and e
1
i , . . . , e
ki
1 are the
simple progress sequence for each block Bi, then the sequence
e11, . . . , e
k1−1
1 , e
2
2, . . . , e
k2−1
2 , . . . , e
2
n, . . . , e
kn
n is the simple progress sequence
for BT
• If BT is B : loop with places p1, . . . pn, then either the single entry |p1|+
. . .+ |pn| is the simple progress sequence for BT .
The sequence of complex progress measures entries is defined inductively over
the block tree BT of the CPN module:
• If BT is B : atomic, then complex progress sequence consist of |s|, |e|
where s is the entry place of the block B and e is the exit place.
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• If BT is B : sequence with sub blocks B1, . . . Bn, and e
1
i , . . . , e
ki
i are the
complex progress sequences for Bi, then
e11, . . . , e
k1−1
1 , e
1
2, . . . , e
k2−1
2 , . . . , e
1
n, . . . , e
kn
n is the simple sequence for BT .
• If BT is B : choice with sub blocks B1, . . . Bn, and e
1
i , . . . , e
ki
1 are the
complex progress sequence for each block Bi, then the sequence
e11, . . . , e
k1−1
1 , e
2
2, . . . , e
k2−1
2 , . . . , e
2
n, . . . , e
kn
n is the complex progress sequence
for BT
• If BT is B : loop with places with sub block B1 and B2 with the complex
progress sequence e1, . . . , en for B1, then e
1, . . . , en is also the complex
progress sequence for BT .
Now, the progress measures for the complete system can be built from the
progress sequences (either the simple or the complex ones) for the tester and
service modules by concatenating the sequences: The concatenation would first
choose the sequences for the service testers and then the sequences for all the
service level modules. Note that if there is a driver place of a service tester
attached to the service, this driver place would also be added to the progress
measure sequence of the service level module at the end (as for the end place
for the send service in our example).
Note that for each single service either the simple or the complex measure
could be chosen. It very much depends on the nature and the depth of the loop
which of these choices help reducing the effort for exploring the state space. The
choice for each service level module would be left to the modeller. In principle,
it is even possible to combine the complex measure and the simple measure
within a single service level module – starting with the complex measure for the
outer loop constructs and then switching to the simple measure at some nesting
level. But, defining these combined measures for a single service level module
would result in a very technical definition. Therefore, we do not formally define
combined complex and simple measures for a single service here.
Anyway, as for all heuristics, these measures serve as a good guess only; it
might still be possible to be improved by choosing the simple or the complex
progress measures for the different modules or by by adding some entries con-
cerning the the live-cycle variables. Such manual manipulations would also be
left to the modeller.
6.3 Verification Results
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of verification using the sweep-line method
and the progress measures defined above, we present the verification of a sim-
ple end state property assuring that the protocol will terminate in a consistent
state. The property checks that all the modules are ended in all final states.
This was checked manually and by automatically checking all end states with
the simple predicate P1 shown below. The predicate says that the four places
d3, endFinalAtomic,endRecAck and endRec are all marked with a unit token.
This means that the service tester and all the services are terminated.
• P1: d3 = [()] andalso endFinalAtomic = [()] andalso endRecAck = [()]
andalso endRec = [()]
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Configuration Visited states Peak stored Num unique end states P1 time
1 msg, non-
lossy
156 77 2 yes 0.034905s
1 msg, lossy 186 99 2 yes 0.029867s
3 msg, non-
lossy
2222 2014 4 yes 0.399659s
3 msg, lossy 2928 2700 4 yes 0.643134s
7 msg, non-
lossy
117584 115373 8 yes 216.197694s
7 msg, lossy 160620 158388 8 yes 532.674399s
Table 1: Verification results using the simple progress measure
Configuration Visited states Peak stored Num unique end states P1 time
1 msg, non-
lossy
165 63 2 yes 0.029353s
1 msg, lossy 196 78 2 yes 0.035034s
3 msg, non-
lossy
2790 1582 4 yes 0.489735s
3 msg, lossy 4037 2187 4 yes 0.855804s
7 msg, non-
lossy
143531 86636 8 yes 32.384360s
7 msg, lossy 263608 124661 8 yes 80.835973s
Table 2: Verification results using the complex progress measure
We ran the verification using two different progress measures. The results
of the verification are shown in Table 1 using the simple progress measure and
Table 2 using the complex progress measure. We used two configuration param-
eters, the number of messages to be sent and whether the channel is lossy. We
see that the predicate holds for all configurations. Also, we see that the number
of states grows fairly fast with the number of messages. We see that the verifica-
tion using the simple progress measure consistently visits fewer states (counting
duplicate encounters twice) than the complex progress measure. This is because
the states surrounding and inside loops are added, which means they count as a
single progress measure point by the simple progress measure, while they are all
included as if the loop was a sequence using the complex progress measure. The
peak number of states stored at the same time, however, is consistently lower for
the complex progress measure. This means that the peak memory consumption,
is lower using this metric. Furthermore, for the larger state spaces, the time
the verification takes is also significantly lower using the complex progress mea-
sure. This means that the complex measure is probably preferable with large
state spaces when the model includes loops. It is likely that a tailored progress
measure would out-perform both the complex and simple progress measure.
7 Conclusion and Related Work
In this paper we have presented a formal definition of Pragmatics Annotated
Coloured Petri Nets (PA-CPNs), the net class that forms the basis for our code
generation technique. Furthermore we have shown that the structure of PA-
CPNs can be exploited to automatically derive some suitable progress measures
for the sweep-line method.
PA-CPNs are not the first formally defined sub-class of CPNs for code gener-
ation: also Process-Partitioned CPNs (PP-CPNs) [4, 7] were defined for making
code generation possible. One important advantage of PA-CPNs over PP-CPNs
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is that they clearly display the available services of a principal in the PLMs.
With PA-CPNs, we are also able to use the PLMs to reduce the number of
states in memory at any one time during state-space generation by taking into
account the LCV places, even though we could not exploit that in the example
discussed in this paper.
PA-CPNs have been introduced mainly with code generation in mind (with
different objectives as discussed in [5]). In this paper, we have formally defined
PA-CPNs, and it turned out that the objective of code generation does not spoil
the possibility of verifying the respective models; on the contrary, the additional
structure can even be exploited for improving verification in combination with
the sweep-line method.
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